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Vue lecture

Australia: To Disclose or Not To Disclose? Preparing to meet the new ADM disclosure requirements

From 10 December 2026, the new Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 1.7 in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) will require entities to disclose the use of automated (or substantially automated) decision-making (ADM) in their privacy policies.

Disclosure is required where computer programs are used to make decisions, or do things substantially and directly related to making decisions, that could reasonably be expected to significantly affect an individual’s rights or interests, and where personal information is used in the operation of the computer program.

If the test above is met, APP 1.8 requires the following information to be disclosed:

  • the kinds of personal information used in relation to the program; and
  • the kinds of such decisions made solely by the program; and
  • the kinds of such decisions for which a thing, that is substantially and directly related to making the decision, is done by the program.

On 30 September 2026, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) published guidance on the forthcoming ADM transparency obligations. Key takeaways from the guidance include the following:

  • A human decision-maker’s degree of reliance on the computer program’s outputs is relevant. A decision may still fall within APP 1.7 where a program provides recommendations or rankings that are a key factor in the ultimate outcome, even if a human ultimately reviews or approves the decision. Extensive human oversight makes the decision less likely to be captured, and the transparency and explainability of outputs available to the decision-maker are also relevant considerations. Conversely, where the program’s recommendations are rarely overturned or overridden, the decision is more likely to be in scope. Simply having a “human in the loop” does not automatically exclude a decision from APP 1.7.
  • An output does not need to be the “final” decision. “Substantially” means where the computer program is a key factor in facilitating the human’s decision making. For example, if a decision would have been made differently, or may not have been made at all, without use of the computer program. An output will be “directly related” to a decision if it has a clear nexus to the decision. Anterior steps in the decision-making process may therefore fall within scope of APP 1.7 if they are “substantially and directly related” to the final decision. Entities should look at decision-making processes holistically, and consider the extent to which the outputs of a computer program meaningfully influence its decisions.
  • Whether a decision significantly affects an individual’s rights or interests should be assessed objectively. The OAIC provides a non-exhaustive list of potentially significant rights and interests, including access to employment, housing, education, health services, insurance, credit, government benefits and “significant goods or services“, such as baby formula, gluten-free foods, pharmacy items and medications. The examples suggest that significance should be assessed with reference to the decision’s objective impact on affected individuals and, in the case of significant goods and services, necessity. However, an individual’s circumstances, including any vulnerability they may be experiencing, should also be considered when assessing whether a decision disproportionately affects them over others.
  • Commercial-in-confidence information remains protected. Trade secrets and commercially sensitive information do not need to be disclosed under APP 1.7 if doing so could harm the entity’s commercial interests (for example, by removing an opportunity for revenue or reducing competitive advantage in the market). However, information is not exempt from disclosure simply because it has some commercial value, nor where it could cause ridicule, criticism or embarrassment.
  • The level of detail disclosed must be meaningful to a reasonable person. The OAIC does not expect granular technical explanations of how the computer programs work that would overwhelm consumers. It is appropriate to aggregate the categories of decisions and types of information in the policy whilst still complying with the transparency obligation, provided that a reasonable person can understand how their personal information is being handled in the process.
  • Information may be needed from suppliers. APP 1.7(a) requires disclosure of ADM that an entity “arranges for” (even if the entity does not use the computer program in question itself). The OAIC recommends that, in order to assist customers with the disclosure requirement, vendors of relevant third-party software or enterprise solutions provide clear, high-level information about how their software can be used to make decisions. However as this is guidance only (and not a firm legal obligation) it remains to be seen if vendors will comply.

Examples of ADM use cases where the OAIC considers that disclosure may be required include:

  • use of facial recognition technology in a retail store or stadium for watchlist matching;
  • recruitment software used to sort through candidate profiles and make hiring decisions;
  • differential and/or personalised pricing practices used by online retailers in the sale of significant goods;
  • computer programs used to approve or reject a loan or credit application;
  • targeted advertising relating to the decision to sell significant goods or services; and
  • reports created by AI used to rank employee performance and determine promotions, or decide bonus/remuneration outcomes.

Importantly, the OAIC has emphasised that the disclosure obligations are not onerous. If in doubt, entities should err on the side of transparency and adopt an inclusive approach when updating their privacy policies. The assessment underpinning the decision to disclose (or not) is the key exercise that the OAIC wants businesses to undertake.

Rather than treating particular technologies, decisions or activities as automatically within or outside scope, businesses operating in Australia should use the OAIC’s guidance to identify where ADM is being used in their operations, and determine whether each use case meets the threshold for disclosure. The way that businesses use software, tools and other computer programs can also change over time, and so any decisions on the applicability of APPs 1.7 – 1.9 should be reviewed on a regular basis. 

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UK: Scottish courts reaffirm threshold for GDPR damages claims

The UK GDPR establishes a robust framework for the protection of personal data, requiring organisations to give due regard to individuals’ data protection rights. Importantly, it recognises that the consequences of a data breach may extend beyond financial loss. Article 82 UK GDPR, supplemented by section 168 of the Data Protection Act 2018, provides a right to compensation for both material and non-material damage, including harm such as distress, anxiety and reputational damage. The threshold for proving damage arising from any breach of the UK GDPR has, to date, received greater judicial analysis in England than in Scotland.

Two recent Scottish decisions, the latter published last week, provide reassurance for controllers by reaffirming that, consistent with Lloyd v Google, a mere data protection infringement does not entitle a claimant to compensation.

In Prentice v Chief Constable of Police Scotland [2025] SC LAN 32, the sheriff dismissed a claim for compensation under section 169 of the Data Protection Act 2018, finding that while the claimant averred distress, stress, anxiety and frustration, no details were provided as to how or when those effects manifested. Claims for financial loss arising from legal expenses, as well as an alleged disadvantage, were also dismissed due to a lack of sufficient specification.

In Henderson v The Scottish Ministers [2026] SC GLA 104, published last week, the sheriff also rejected a claim for damages arising from an admitted data breach, holding that evidence of psychiatric injury and distress was found to be neither credible nor reliable, and self-reported symptoms were unsupported by the contemporaneous medical records. The expert psychiatric diagnosis, founded entirely on the pursuer’s own account taken at face value, was given no weight.

The decisions reinforce that, whilst there is no formal threshold of seriousness, the onus of proving real, causally connected damage remains firmly on the claimant. Self-reported distress unsupported by independent evidence will not suffice.

While these cases concern individual claims, they sit within a broader landscape of expanding collective redress activity in Scotland. The emergence of certified group proceedings arising from data incidents – with three such proceedings underway to date – underscores the increasing use of Scotland’s group litigation framework for data protection claims.

The damage threshold principles confirmed in Prentice and Henderson carry particular significance in this context. Opt-out class proceedings face an inherent structural challenge in demonstrating individualised, causally connected harm across a large and diverse class. Where courts require more than bare assertions of distress, the task of establishing compensable damage at scale becomes materially more difficult for representative parties to discharge.

For Controllers, the message from these two decisions is one of cautious reassurance. Scottish courts will hold claimants, whether proceeding individually or as part of a class, to the evidential standard that the law demands. A breach alone opens no door to an award. That said, the volume of certified class proceedings is a reminder that robust data governance remains not just best practice, but the surest defence.

On 7 and 8 October 2026, the Supreme Court will consider the issue of whether a threshold of seriousness applies to claims for damages under the GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 in Paymaster (1836) Limited v Farley and others – which will provide authoritative clarity to these issues.

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EU: Commission proposes a new KIDS Act to protect children online

On 17 September 2026, the European Commission unveiled its proposal for the EU KIDS Act (EU Keeping Internet Digital Spaces Accountable and Trustworthy), a harmonised EU framework designed to reshape how children engage with online services. The proposal goes well beyond age verification requirements and seeks to fundamentally change the design of digital services used by minors, placing greater responsibility on technology providers to create age-appropriate digital environments. It builds on existing legislation such as the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and the EU AI Act but introduces more specific rules focused on child safety.

Which Services Are Covered?

The KIDS Act imposes extensive obligations on a broad range of online services. Its scope extends beyond social media platforms to encompass a wide range of online services, including:

  • online social networking services;
  • video-sharing platform services;
  • app stores;
  • online games;
  • operating systems;
  • AI companions; and
  • general conversational chatbots.

Summary of key requirements

The proposal is built around four core themes:

  1. EU-wide minimum age for social media accounts

A key feature of the proposal is the establishment of common age-based rules governing children’s access to social media and certain video-sharing platforms across the EU. The Commission’s objective is to introduce a gradual and age-appropriate pathway into the online environment, reflecting growing concerns about the impact that social media and algorithm-driven content can have on children’s wellbeing and development. The Commission emphasises the need for a harmonised framework to avoid a fragmented landscape of national age thresholds and access requirements.

Under the proposal:

  • Children under 13 will be prohibited from accessing social media services. They would, however, be able to access specially designed child-friendly video-sharing services through an account managed by a parent or guardian.
  • Children aged 13 and 14 will only be able access social media and certain video-sharing services through parent-managed “mini accounts”. These accounts would offer limited functionality, enhanced parental controls and restrictions on use, including a daily screen-time limit.
  • From age 15, minors will be permitted to open and manage their own social media accounts and access covered video-sharing services independently.

In addition, under the proposal, providers would be required to determine whether existing account holders are under the age of 15. Accounts belonging to users identified as under 15, or whose age cannot be verified, would need to be disabled. Providers designated as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) under the DSA would face additional obligations, including submitting a compliance plan demonstrating, through robust technical and evidentiary measures, a “high degree of confidence” that users have reached the age of 15.

  1. Safety-by-design obligations

While the age-based access rules have attracted the greatest public attention, the KIDS Act’s broader ambition is to address the design choices that can encourage excessive use, amplify harmful content, or expose minors to inappropriate interactions. In doing so, it reflects a growing regulatory view that children’s online safety cannot be achieved through parental controls and age verification alone, but must be embedded into the architecture of the services themselves.

To achieve this, the proposed KIDS Act requires a wide range of online services used by minors, including social media platforms, video-sharing platforms, online games, AI companions and chatbots, to implement extensive safety-by-design measures. These include:

  • Restrictions on addictive features such as infinite scrolling, autoplay functionality, reward mechanisms and engagement-driven notifications, particularly during sleeping hours.
  • Safer recommender systems that provide minors with greater control over how content is suggested and reduce the risk of being drawn into harmful “rabbit holes” through profiling-based recommendation algorithms.
  • Privacy-protective default settings, including private accounts by default and limits on the collection and use of children’s personal data.
  • Strong protections against unwanted contact from strangers, cyberbullying and other forms of harmful interactions.
  • Child-friendly reporting, blocking and support tools that are easy for young users to access and understand.

The proposal also introduces specific safeguards for AI companions and chatbots. This includes requiring AI companions to be disabled by default for minors and avoid design features and system behaviours that simulate interpersonal relations that are likely to create emotional dependencies, manipulate behaviour or otherwise exploit children’s vulnerabilities.

  1. Age verification and parental controls

The proposal introduces specific age assurance obligations requiring providers to establish whether users are above or below relevant age thresholds and to ensure that children are provided with experiences, features and protections that are appropriate for their age. The proposal also introduces a framework for verifying parental responsibility where an adult seeks to create or manage an account on a child’s behalf.

The proposal acknowledges that effective age assurance must be balanced with users’ privacy and data protection rights. As a result, it emphasises that age verification and age estimation mechanisms should be designed in a privacy-preserving manner, minimising the collection and retention of personal data and avoiding the introduction of de facto identity verification for access to online services. The proposal requires age to be verified through certified solutions independent of the platforms, including a free EU age verification app. The proposal requires Member States to offer at least one free way to prove age, including for people without digital ID.

To strengthen the effectiveness of these safeguards, social media services and video-sharing platforms are required to verify users’ ages at the point of account creation.

Parents and guardians will also be given enhanced control tools, including screen-time management, contact supervision and account-setting controls.

The proposal goes beyond the GDPR’s specific rules on children’s consent. Its age assurance and age-appropriate design obligations are not limited to processing based on consent but may also affect services that rely on other legal bases, such as contractual necessity or legitimate interests.

  1. Compliance, Oversight and Penalties

    Primary responsibility for supervising the largest services would rest with the European Commission, building on the model established under the DSA. In-scope providers could face substantial penalties for non-compliance, including fines of up to 6% of their worldwide annual turnover and, in the most serious cases, temporary restrictions on the provision of services within the EU.

    The proposal also introduces proactive compliance obligations, particularly for VLOPs. The KIDS Act shifts the burden from regulators to providers, requiring VLOPs to proactively demonstrate, through a Commission-facing compliance plan and independent audits at their own expense, that they can meet obligations before their services are made available to children. The KIDS Act also introduces a supervisory fee, capped at 0.03% of a provider’s worldwide annual net income, to fund oversight and enforcement activities. The fee would apply not only to in-scope VLOPs, but also to certain providers of AI companions, general conversational chatbots and video gaming platforms.

    Timing

    The EU KIDS Act must now pass through the EU legislative process before it can be adopted. Several aspects of the proposal are likely to attract significant debate, particularly the age assurance requirements and the proposed age threshold of 15. While the European Commission has called for the legislation to be prioritised, adoption is unlikely to be immediate. Once adopted, most of the Act’s obligations would begin to apply six months after coming into force, giving providers a relatively short window to implement what are likely to be substantial compliance changes.

    What does this mean for organisations?

    Although the proposal is primarily aimed at online platforms and digital services used by children, its implications are likely to be far-reaching. Organisations operating consumer-facing digital services will need to assess whether their services fall within the scope of the Act and, if so, whether existing product designs, recommendation systems, engagement features and age assurance mechanisms are compliant.

    The proposal also reinforces a growing regulatory expectation that children’s safety should be embedded into product development from the outset. Businesses may therefore need to revisit governance structures, risk assessments, design processes and compliance programmes to ensure that child safety considerations are integrated across the product lifecycle.

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    US / EU: US Supreme Court overturns Humphrey’s Executor: Implications for independent agencies and US–EU data transfers


    The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Slaughter significantly alters the constitutional framework governing independent regulatory agencies and may have implications for transatlantic personal data transfers.

    The six-to-three decision overturns Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, a 1935 case establishing that Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners could be removed by the President only for cause. Learn more about how the ruling reshapes and clarifies the relationship between the President and most independent agencies in this DLA Piper client alert.

    According to the Court’s ruling in Trump v. Slaughter, officials who exercise executive power are subject to presidential superintendence, including the President’s power of removal. As a result, agency leadership and policy direction may become more closely aligned with changes in presidential administrations. Among the agencies affected by the decision is the FTC, which enforces compliance with privacy standards in personal data transfers between the European Union and the US.

    In this alert, we discuss how the Trump v. Slaughter decision may affect the regulation of transatlantic data transfers within the context of the EU–US Data Privacy Framework (DPF).

    Potential impact on international data transfers

    The EU–US Data Privacy Framework

    The constitutional changes arising from Trump v. Slaughter could carry implications for the current DPF and the legal mechanisms underpinning transatlantic data flows.

    The transfer of personal data from the EU and the United Kingdom to the US has been a contentious legal issue for more than two decades.

    The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) annulled two previous European Commission decisions due to concerns about US surveillance laws and the lack of judicial remedies in the US. The so-called Schrems I and Schrems II decisions invalidated the US–EU Safe Harbor Framework in 2015 and the EU–US Privacy Shield Framework in 2020, respectively.

    The US–EU Safe Harbor Framework required participating US companies to self-certify to the US Department of Commerce that they complied with the Safe Harbor privacy principles. The EU–US Privacy Shield Framework subsequently provided a legal mechanism for companies to transfer personal data from the EU to the US.

    In 2023, the European Commission issued the DPF, a third EU–US deal that permits the transfer of personal data to US organizations that have self-certified their compliance with the framework’s principles through the US Department of Commerce.

    The DPF was predicated on the provision of independent and binding redress mechanisms for EU individuals whose personal data is processed by US intelligence agencies. The FTC is a central part of that oversight architecture.

    The independence requirement under EU law

    EU treaty law, namely Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, requires that:

    • The oversight of data protection matters must be done by an independent authority, and
    • When assessing the adequacy of third countries to which data subject to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can be transferred, the existence and effective functioning of independent supervisory authorities is a critical factor.

    Looking ahead

    It remains to be seen whether the European Commission will elect to repeal the DPF. The DPF has an in-built review mechanism, the first of which took place in 2024, which established a four-year cycle for further reviews – meaning a review would not be expected until 2028.

    An out-of-cycle review could prove time-consuming against the backdrop of increased digital sovereignty in the EU. A separate challenge to the DPF by Member of French Parliament Philippe Latombe, while initially rejected by the EU General Court, remains under appeal to the CJEU.

    In the meantime, businesses relying on the DPF for their transatlantic transfer programs are encouraged to continue monitoring the evolving situation and maintain backup transfer solutions.

    For more information, please contact the authors or your DLA Piper attorney.

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